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COMMENT
POLICE BULLETINS AND PRIVATE SEARCHES
Rail and air freight departments in southern California often
receive police bulletins requesting them to contact the police if ship-
ments of marijuana or other drugs are discovered or suspected. The
bulletins usually request only that the private parties notify the police;
but often after receipt of a police bulletin freight department super-
visors on their own initiative authorize either the seizure or search of
suspicious packages or of the luggage of suspected narcotics smugglers.
In three recent cases,' California courts have been asked to determine
whether such searches or seizures by airline employees are police
activities and thus within the purview of the fourth and fourteenth
amendments. The California Supreme Court has side-stepped the issue
entirely, but two California appellate courts have held that private
party searches or seizures in response to a police bulletin are not subject
to constitutional scrutiny in a criminal prosecution.2 In People v.
McGrew,3 an airline employee, suspicious of McGrew's long hair,
nervous demeanor, and heavy footlocker, broke open the locker on the
I Abt v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 418, 462 P2d 10, 82 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1969)
(en banc) ; People v. McGrew, 1 Cal. 3d 404, 462 P2d 1, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1969)
(en banc) ; People v. Temple, 80 Cal. Rptr. 885 (1969).
21n People v. McGrew, 1 Cal. 3d 404, 409, 462 P2d 1, 4, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473, 476
(1969) (en banc), the California Supreme Court stated:
We find it unnecessary to determine whether Dowling, the United Airlines
employee, must be considered an agent of the police in opening the footlockers
because, even assuming that he was not, the subsequent searches by law en-
forcement officers or at their express and specific direction . . . were unlawful
and the evidence must be suppressed.
With nearly identical language the court disposed of the same issue in Abt v. Superior
Court, 1 Cal. 3d 418, 421, 462 P.2d 10, 11, 82 Cal. Rptr. 481, 483 (1969).
But a California court of appeal, People v. McGrew, 75 Cal. Rptr. 378, vacated,
1 Cal. 3d 404, 462 P2d 1, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1969) (en banc), squarely faced the
issue and found Dowling to be acting independently of the police and the search
therefore not subject to fourth and fourteenth amendment prohibitions. A different
California court of appeal reached a similar conclusion in People v. Temple, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 885 (1969).
3 75 Cal. Rptr. 378, vacated, 1 Cal. 3d 404, 462 P2d 1. 82 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1969)
(en banc). The headnote to the appellate court decision indicates that the case was
decided on Feb. 17, 1969, and that a hearing was granted on Apr. 30, 1969. The
California Court Rules permit the supreme court, within 30 days after a decision of a
court of appeal becomes final as to that court, to transfer the cause, either on its
own motion or on petition by a party, for hearing and decision. CAL. S. CT. & App.
(Civ. & CRIb.) R. 28(a) (Supp. 1970). The supreme court for good cause may
extend the period up to an additional 60 days. Id. A decision of a court of appeal
becomes final as to that court 30 days after filing. Id. 24(a). Thus the supreme
court heard the state's appeal from the trial court's order to suppress exactly as did
the court of appeal. The latter court reversed, but the supreme court affirmed,
thereby vacating the court of appeal decision. As pointed out above, however, note 2
supra, the supreme court effectively skirted the issue whether the airline employee
was acting as an agent of the police.
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advice of the freight supervisor and discovered marijuana.4  The police
bulletin in People v. Temple ' contained a detailed description of the
suspected trunks, including their size, weight, and probable destination,
and a photograph of a similar recently seized trunk.' The freight
supervisor withheld Temple's trunks from their scheduled flight 7 and
called the police, who searched the trunks without a warrant and
seized eighteen or nineteen bricks of marijuana from each trunk. The
court's reasoning in Temple is representative of the appellate court's
in McGrew:
[T]he mere fact that the police bulletin requested freight em-
ployees to contact police when seeing trunks of the type it
depicted and that one agent (and so probably others) had
been encouraged by UAL [United Air Lines] to cooperate
with law enforcement did not make the UAL personnel agents
of the police and did not make the temporary diversion of the
trunks from the scheduled flight a police activity. . . . The
temporary diversion of the trunks was the air freight super-
visor's own idea and a private act. . . . There was no directly
joint action of the type present in Stapleton v. Superior Court
. . . .There is, certainly, a line to be drawn between joining
the police in a specific investigation already launched by them
and making a simple response to a general request for co-
operation in detecting crime, a badge of good citizenship.,
This Comment, however, will argue that the nature of the relationship
between the police and the freight supervisors in Temple and McGrew
required that the supervisors' acts be deemed police activity and there-
fore subject to the fourth and fourteenth amendments. The Comment
will also propose tests hopefully helpful in deciding when a private
citizen's activity induced by police request is, in fact, police activity.
4 Similar facts arose in Abt v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 418, 462 P2d 10, 82
Cal. Rptr. 481 (1969), decided the same day and in substantially the same fashion
as McGrew. In McGrew it is unclear whether the freight department ever in fact
received a police bulletin immediately prior to the search. The employee had been
alerted by his superiors to watch for heavy new footlockers, and had heard "scuttle-
butt" that the warning originated with the Honolulu police. The trial court found
that the warnings had come from the police, but the court of appeal was sceptical
and declared the origin of the warnings immaterial. 75 Cal. Rptr. at 379-81.
5 80 Cal. Rptr. 885 (1969).
61d. at 890-91 n.9 (partial text of police bulletin).
7The court's opinion does not state whether the trunks merely missed their
scheduled flight or were intentionally diverted from it by the supervisor. Id. at 887
n2. But the court was apparently willing to assume the latter. Id. at 889.
8Id. at 889-90. The court of appeal in McGrew held:
Whether the suggestion airlines be on the alert for such footlockers originated
from the police is immaterial. . . . The police do not necessarily make agents
of citizens they warn concerning crimes. . ..
o , . Here Dowling did not act in a joint enterprise with, or as an agent
of the governmental law enforcement agency.
75 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
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I. PRIVATE ACTIVITY AND TiHE FOURTi AMENDMENT
The Temple and McGrew courts attempted to establish that the
activity of the supervisor in seizing the trunks was private and therefore
within the well-litigated and discussed private party exception to the
fourth amendment.9 The facts of Burdeau v. McDowell," the Supreme
Court's forum for announcing the exception, provide a typical illustra-
tion of the type of private activity exempted. In Burdeau, private
parties, independent of police suggestion, stole incriminating evidence
from a safe and turned it over to the government authorities. Refusing
to require the return or exclusion of the evidence, the Court said:
[T]he record clearly shows that no official of the Federal
Government had anything to do with the wrongful seizure of
the petitioner's property, or any knowledge thereof until
several months after the property had been taken from
him ....
The papers having come into the possession of the Gov-
ernment without a violation of petitioner's rights by gov-
ernmental authority, we see no reason why the fact that
individuals, unconnected with the Government, may have
wrongfully taken them, should prevent them from being held
for use in prosecuting an offense where the documents are of
an incriminatory character.'
9 See, e.g., Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) ; Watson v. United States,
391 F2d 927 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 985 (1968); United
States v. McGuire, 381 F2d 306, 313 n.5 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1053 (1968) ; Gold v. United States, 378 F2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967) ; Gandy v. Watkins,
237 F. Supp. 266 (M.D. Ala. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 946 (1965); Geniviva v.
Bingler, 206 F. Supp. 81 (W.D. Pa. 1961) ; People v. Randazzo, 220 Cal. App. 2d
768, 34 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1000 (1964) ; State v. Holliday,
169 N.W2d 768 (Iowa 1969) ; Sackler v. Sackler, 16 App. Div. 2d 423, 229 N.Y.S.2d
61 (1962). The exemption" of private searches from the fourth amendment has been
criticized extensively. See Black, Burdeau v. McDowall [sic]-A Judicial Milepost
on the Road to Absolutism, 12 B.U.L. REv. 32 (1932); Note, Seizures By Private
Parties: Exclusion in Criminal Cases, 19 STAN. L. REv. 608 (1967); 63 COLUO. L.
REv. 168 (1963); 19 DRAKE L. REv. 476 (1970); 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 206 (1969);
12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 232 (1964); 3 U. SAN FRAN. L. REv. 159 (1968); 1966 UTAH
L. REv. 271.
10256 U.S. 465 (1921).
31 Id. at 475-76. The private activity in cases adhering to Burdea's reasoning
follow a discernible pattern clearly distinguishable from the private activity in Temple
and McGrew. In the Burdeau line of cases, the police neither requested nor expected
that evidence would be wrongfully taken from the defendant. See, e.g., Barnes v.
United States, 373 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1967) (search of travel case at initiative of
motel owner) ; Geniviva v. Bingler, 206 F. Supp. 81 (W.D. Pa. 1961) (robbery from
Geniviva provided IRS evidence to determine the correctness of his tax returns);
People v. Randazzo, 220 Cal. App. 2d 768, 34 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 1000 (1964) (search by clothing store detective by looking under dressing room
curtain to catch shoplifters) ; State v. H-tolliday, 169 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 1969) (tele-
phone company received customer complaint of threatening phone calls, recorded
numbers dialed from defendant's phone); Sackler v. Sackler, 16 App. Div. 2d 423,
229 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1962) (search by husband to gain evidence against wife in divorce
proceeding). See also United States v. Goldberg, 330 F.2d 30 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 953 (1964).
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But an illegal search by a private party may be subject to the
exclusionary rule if the act is in fact attributable to some governmental
association. For example, in People v. Tarantino,' the police paid
and instructed a private citizen to "bug" the defendant's apartment.
The California Supreme Court found that the citizen was an employee
of the police and that his activities were subject to fourth amendment
prohibitions. If a private party is not paid by the police but acts
nevertheless at their instance and under their instruction, his activity
is police activity." "Joint action" by the police and a private party
is also police activity. In Stapleton v. Superior Court,'4 distinguished
in both Temple and McGrew, the police and private credit card agents
carefully planned a joint raid to arrest the defendant. The credit card
agents searched the defendant's car in the course of the raid. The
California Supreme Court, excluding the evidence of the illegal search,
stated:
The search of petitioner's car was clearly part of a joint
operation by police and the credit card agents aimed at arrest-
ing petitioner and obtaining evidence against him. This
official participation in the planning and implementation of
the overall operation is sufficient without more to taint with
state action the subsequent acts of such credit card agents."
Even mere police presence at or foreknowledge with acquiescence in a
search or seizure by a private party will make the private acts police
acts.' 6
1245 Cal. 2d 590, 290 P.2d 505 (1955).
13See, e.g., Corngold v. United States, 367 F2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966) (police at
airport requested that airline employees open a specific package) ; People v. Fierro,
236 Cal. App. 2d 344, 46 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1965) (specific request by police that hotel
manager go to defendant's room and seize samples of narcotics).
14 70 Cal. 2d 97, 447 P.2d 967, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1968).
15 Id. at 100, 447 P2d at 969, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 577 (footnote omitted). Stapleton
also suggests that the cases construing the phrase "under color of law" may be useful
in determining when the activities of a private citizen in conjunction with the police
are attributable to the police. Id. at 101-02, 447 P2d at 970, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 578;
see United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755-56 (1966):
This is not to say, however, that the involvement of the State need be
either exclusive or direct. In a variety of situations the Court has found
state action of a nature sufficient to create rights under the Equal Protection
Clause even though the participation of the State was peripheral, or its action
was only one of several co-operative forces leading to the constitutional
violation.
16 See Stapleton v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 97, 103, 447 P.2d 967. 970-71,
73 Cal. Rptr. 575, 578-79 (1968) ("[T]he police need not have requested or directed the
search in order to be guilty of 'standing idly by'; knowledge of the illegal search
coupled with a failure to protect the petitioner's rights against such a search suffices.") ;
Moody v. United States, 163 A.2d 337 (D.C. Ct. App. 1960) (police accompanied
victim of a theft to the apartment of the defendant where the victim recovered stolen
goods, later introduced as evidence); State v. Scrotsky, 39 N.J. 410, 189 A2d 23
(1963). In United States v. Goldberg, 330 F.2d 30 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
953 (1964), holding that, because the police believed that the evidence they requested
was already in the informer's hands, the Government did not invade the defendant's
privacy when the informer thereafter stole the evidence, the court implied that, had
the Government known that the informer would steal the evidence, governmental
action would have been found. But see note 30 infra.
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II. POLICE BULLETINS
A. A Test for Substantial Police Relationship
Private activity in response to police bulletins falls between the
clear cases of police-requested activity and purely private acts. As
Temple and McGrew emphasized, the police are not initially aware
that a particular act has been performed in response to their bulletin.17
The acts of the freight supervisors in the two cases were done without
police planning, presence, foreknowledge, or direct supervision. But
unlike Burdeau and its progeny,' police bulletins may motivate private
persons to take steps to aid the police in gathering information; and
the police expect bulletins to induce individuals to obtain information
in the future, while in Burdeau the police requested information already
in the hands of the private party. The balance may be struck between
private and police activity by attributing the private citizen's acts to
the police whenever the acts, other than the mere calling of the police,
would not have occurred but for the police request.
Thus a bulletin requesting a private party to inform the police
whenever he may come across criminal activity would not make the
recipient a police agent when relaying information he would have
gathered in the absence of the bulletin. But when the bulletin requests
the private party to do something beyond the scope of his normal
duties or activities (for example, to detain or open a particular trunk
scheduled for a particular flight), or when such unusual activity is
induced because of the bulletin, then the additional action may be
treated as state action.' In United States v. Small,20 the police
suspected that drugs were being stored in subway lockers, and asked
a subway locker inspector to call them if he found any contraband
drugs in the course of his inspections.2 The inspector continued to
inspect the lockers at his regular pace, reaching an individual locker
about once every two weeks. In the course of his inspections he
opened a brown paper bag which he believed contained food but in fact
contained marijuana. He notified the police by telephone and, because
he could not stay by the locker until the police arrived, suggested that
he change the lock on the locker. The police agreed. The court held
the inspector to be a police agent when the lock was changed although
not when he initially opened the locker.
The inspection of the locker by Fortune [the inspector] was
conducted in the ordinary course of the Company's business,
and in the exercise of the right of inspection it reserved. The
mere receipt by Fortune of the telephone call from the Cam-
bridge Police did not, under the facts established, make For-
17 80 Cal. Rptr. at 889-90; 75 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
18 See note 11 supra.
19 See text accompanying notes 31-37 infra.
20297 F. Supp. 582 (D. Mass. 1969).
21 The request was made by telephone rather than by written police bulletin.
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tune their agent. . . . Fortune's inspection of the locker's
contents, which he determined included marihuana, rises no
higher than an observation of what was believed to be contra-
band by a citizen who had the right to be where he was,
and was not the act of a law enforcement agent. When, how-
ever, he changed locker 725's lock, he did so, acting not
within the course and scope of the Company's business, but
pursuant to [the police's] request .... 22
A similar result might have been reached had Fortune broken with
his schedule after the police request and searched every locker every
day, if possible. Such extraordinary activity might easily be attributed
to his desire, stimulated by the bulletin, to aid the police in discovering
evidence of crime.
The test, then, is essentially one of causation: but for the bulletin
(or police request in any form), the private activity would not have
occurred. Of course, determinations of causation are often difficult.
In the hypothetical above, the inspector may have abandoned his usual
schedule for any number of reasons-perhaps to protect more effec-
tively against the damages caused by decaying food in the lockers.
But absent any other apparent reasons for the activity, it may be
presumed that the activity was undertaken in response to the police
request if it would benefit only the police. The reasoning of the
court in Small and of the trial court in McGrew suggests this tech-
nique of presuming causation after the receipt of the request. In Small,
the locker company had no interest in changing the locks. In McGrew,
the trial court suppressed the evidence largely because the airline em-
ployee acted solely for police purposes when he opened the suspicious
baggage.23 Although the airline had reserved the right to inspect
shipments under particular circumstances,24 it had no interest in search-
ing trunks for suspected contraband. In both cases, because no interest
of either employer or employee could be served by the extraordinary
action, it may be presumed that the actions were induced by the police
request for surveillance.25
22297 F. Supp. at 585. Although Fortune suggested the change, the police
acquiesced in it. See cases cited note 16 supra.
23 1 Cal. 3d at 409, 462 P.2d at 4, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
24 Id. at 408, 462 P2d at 3, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 475 (for example, "for improperly
declared goods going at a cheaper rate").
25 In nearly all the cases in the Burdeau line, the evidence was not seized solely
for police purposes. See cases cited note 11 supra. This police purposes test does
not stand independent of the "but for" test. If a citizen, without the initiative of a
bulletin, seizes evidence from another citizen with the sole purpose of convicting him,
the evidence would not be excluded under Burdeau because the police did not request
the seizure. The police purposes test serves merely as an inference to aid in making
the causal link between the bulletin and the searches thereafter.
In People v. Craycraft, 1 Cal. App. 3d 947, 82 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1969), an airline
employee in San Diego thought he smelled liquor emanating from a footlocker. The
airline prohibits the handling of liquids because of the possible damage to other
baggage. The employee opened the trunk and discovered marijuana. In such a
case the initial search would be private even after the receipt of a bulletin because it
was within the scope of the employee's normal duties and not induced by the bulletin.
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A similar approach was taken in Purvis v. Wiseman. 2  A police
detective seeking evidence in a narcotics case asked maids to keep
separate any trash from the defendant's motel room and to bring to
him homemade cigarettes or cigarette butts. There was some question
whether he intended them to bring him all homemade cigarettes or
just those which they would normally remove in the course of cleaning
a room. The court said:
If the maids believed they were expected to remove any
homemade cigarettes, wherever located, and whether or not
trash, they searched the room.
Even if. .. Matoon [the detective] requested the maids
to remove only those homemade cigarettes that were also
trash, it would not negate the element of State action. We
are not concerned with what Matoon intended, but with what
the maids believed. There was no need to mention homemade
cigarettes before the maids entered the room. If, as a result
of this designation, the maids searched Petitioner's room,
their action was State action. The State, having made a
search possible, may not escape the consequences by claiming
Matoon distinguished between those homemade cigarettes that
were trash and those that were not.
The court then ordered that a hearing be held to determine what the
maids believed.
The Purvis court said, in effect, that when a police request induces
a private citizen to perform acts in pursuit of the police cause, which
he would not otherwise have performed, his conduct will be imputed
to the police. The literal text of the police request is not crucial: the
activity induced is determinative.
But the Purvis court neglected to make one important distinction.
The but for test, standing alone, is not altogether satisfactory. Had
the locker inspector in Small, motivated by the police alert and intend-
ing to aid the police, searched subway riders at random and discovered
narcotics, he certainly would not have been considered an agent of
the police: 28 Burdeau should apply unless the police have either knowl-
edge or a reasonable expectation that private action will be taken on
their behalf. The creation of a police agency must be formed in the
expectations of both the principal and the agent, even if the expectations
20 298 F. Supp. 761 (D. Ore. 1969).
27 1d. at 763-64 (emphasis added).
28 The difficulty with the "but for" test in determining the causation issue is -well
illustrated in tort law. Compare It re Polemis, [1921] 3 K.B. 560 (C.A.), with
Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engr Co., [1961] 2 W.L.R. 126
(P.C.).
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are not verbalized.' Thus, rather than looking to what the maids
actually believed they were expected to do, the court in Purvis should
have looked at what acts the police might reasonably have expected
them to take in response to the request. The police should not be
found responsible for unforeseeable acts resulting from idiosyncrasies
or unreasonable misunderstandings. They should be accountable only
for acts-even if not specifically requested-which they might reason-
ably have foreseen as a result of their request."
In measuring reasonable police expectations, the frequency of
police contact with a particular group is important. Numerous previous
contacts might well enable the police to predict fairly accurately the
character of private citizen response to police bulletins or other requests.
The number of cases coming before the California courts indicates that
the police should expect significantly more positive action than simple
police notification from private parties in situations similar to Temple
and McGrew.
Emphasis on reasonable police expectations is particularly im-
portant in view of the purpose of the exclusionary rule. Deterrence
of improper police conduct will not be achieved by excluding evidence
in cases in which it is unlikely that the private action taken could have
been anticipated by the police. 1 A rule of exclusion is unwarranted
unless it will serve to deter improper conduct in the future.3 2 Exclu-
sion when the police could not reasonably anticipate the private citizen's
acts would upset the delicate balance that must be maintained between
strong public interests in deterring official illegality and convicting the
guilty.3 At that point, the exclusionary rule would lose its efficacy
and become instead a "public nuisance."34
In summary, private action taken in response to a police bulletin
warrants a finding of police agency when the activity would not have
occurred but for the bulletin and could reasonably have been expected
by the police.
29 Cf. W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 18 (1964).
S3 But see Gold v. United States, 378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967). The police in
Gold should have known that their actions would induce the opening of the trunk
by the airline employees. The F.B.I. agents, following the activities of Gold and
suspecting that he was shipping obscene matter, informed the airline where Gold
had delivered for shipment five cartons of electronic equipment" that they had reason
to believe that the waybill was inaccurate and the address of the shipper was non-
existent. The agents then left the airline office. Although the airline supervisor
asked, they did not reveal what they suspected were the true contents of the cartons.
The airline opened the packages, found obscene film, and called the agents, who
also looked at the film. A warrant was not obtained until the following day. The
court found the initial search to be private action because the airline had reserved
the right to inspect packages when it believed the waybill to be inconsistent with
the contents. But the court missed the crucial point that 'the police knew the bags
would be opened and anticipated the finding of contraband.
31 Private citizen searches as in Burdeau are therefore not excluded because of
the meager deterrent effect. See, e.g., Note, Seizures By Private Parties: Exclusion
in Criminal Cases, 19 STAN. L. Rxv. 608, 611 (1967).
32 Id.
33 See generally Amsterdam, Search, Seizure and Section 2255: A Comment,
112 U. PA. L. REv. 378, 389 (1964).
84 Id.
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The Temple and McGrew courts did not follow this standard.
In both cases, the police made no specific request that baggage be
searched or seized, but merely asked to be informed if the contents of
bags were found to contain contraband or if suspicious looking baggage
passed through the airlines terminal. Clearly the request was insuffi-
cient to create a police agency if by mere observation or exercise of
the company's rights35 the supervisors observed criminal or suspect
behavior. But in each case the supervisors did more than report
suspicious behavior: they took action described in Temple as "self-
initiated," 36 to seize and search suspicious looking trunks or the bags
of suspicious looking people. Because these searches for contraband
served no airline purpose, the courts should have inferred that the acts
on behalf of the police were induced by the bulletins.3 7  Although
(unlike the change of locks in Small) the police had no foreknowledge
of and thus gave no prior approval to the supervisors' actions, they
might reasonably have foreseen that a supervisor requested to report
suspect trunks would, seeking his "badge of good citizenship," hold
trunks at the terminal for them. Thus, at least sub silentio, the police
requested the supervisors to take illegal actions on the state's behalf,
and should not be allowed to avoid the consequences of their request
by claiming that the acts were purely private.
B. Consequences of Police Agency-Exclusion of Evidence
If private acts induced by a police bulletin are in fact police acts,
then they must conform to fourth amendment requirements if evidence
they produce is not to be excluded at trial.3 Because the fourth
amendment prohibits in most cases searches without warrants, 39 and
because private citizens cannot obtain warrants in California,4o evidence
gathered in a warrantless search by a citizen-agent should be inadmis-
sible unless the police themselves could have acted without a warrant.
Relying on Carroll v. United States,' the Temple court held that
a warrant was unnecessary because the evidence sought would vanish
with the trunks, due to leave the terminal within the hour. But Carroll
is inapposite for airports. Carroll and its progeny rest on the ground
that hesitation on the part of the police may lead to the loss or destruc-
tion of the evidence. But no such possibility existed in Temple. "Nor
was there any likelihood that the lockers would be removed or the
contraband destroyed; both footlockers were safely in the custody of
35 See note 25 supra.
36 80 Cal. Rptr. at 889.
37 See text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
38 See, e.g., United States v. Small, 297 F. Supp. 582 (D. Mass. 1969) (excluding
the evidence).
39 See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) ; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925).4 o See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE § 1523 (West 1970) (a warrant is issued in "the
name of the people, signed by a magistrate, directed to a peace officer, commanding
him to search for personal property, and bring it before the magistrate").
41267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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the airlines." ' The freight supervisor did not have to withhold the
trunks from their flight: he could have called the police to inform
them of his suspicions. The police could then have notified the Detroit
police that specific trunks were on a particular flight and should be
searched and the recipient arrested under a warrant issued in Detroit.43
The court's analysis would have been correct had the trunks been en
route to a foreign country where they might not have been recoverable."
Even accepting the Temple court's notion that a warrant was not
required, the freight supervisor could not seize the trunks unless he
had probable cause to act. The information provided by a bulletin
may furnish the private citizen with probable cause, but only if it is
sufficiently specific to enable a private employee to distinguish between
criminal behavior and behavior consistent with either guilt or innocence.
Thus bulletins identifying with great specificity a particular trunk
which the police have probable cause to seize could also establish
probable cause for a private citizen to act.45 A general alert for
suspicious-looking trunks would normally be insufficient to give prob-
able cause. In exceptional cases, the police bulletin need not specify a
particular item. If the police sufficiently describe a pattern which
would usually occur only in conjunction with criminal activity, the
private citizen may have probable cause to act.
For example, in Hernandez v. United States,4" the Ninth Circuit
found that the police had probable cause to believe trunks in an airport
contained marijuana when the police had observed for two years pre-
vious to the search of Hernandez's trunks a recurring pattern of
circumstances connected with a certain smuggling ring. Marijuana
was shipped by air from Los Angeles to New York on nonstop com-
mercial flights in the luggage of couriers with Latin American sur-
names. The couriers traveled first class, but did not make reservations
in advance; their luggage was new, expensive, usually bore the brand
name "Ventura," and had combination locks; the bags were exceedingly
heavy because of the weight of the marijuana; the couriers usually
paid the overweight charges in cash with large denomination bills.
Airport employees were asked to notify the police if the described
pattern appeared. The pattern was exactly reproduced when Hernandez
bought a ticket on a flight to New York with two bags 115 pounds
over the 40 pound limit. The police were called and on their arrival
42 People v. McGrew, 1 Cal. 3d at 410, 462 P2d at 5, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
43 If the police in one city are hesitant to rely on the police in another, or simply
wish to prosecute the offender themselves, perhaps they could instruct the airline
employee to detain the baggage while they obtain a warrant.
44 See People v. Craycraft, 1 Cal. App. 3d 947, 82 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1969), in
which a freight employee opened a trunk to check for liquor and found what he
believed was marijuana. He called the police, but they did not open the trunk
because it was scheduled for loading in fourteen minutes. Rather, they notified state
narcotics agents that a footlocker was en route from San Diego and contained
marijuana. The recipient of the locker in San Francisco was arrested.
45 Cf. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
46353 F2d 624 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1008 (1966).
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searched the trunks. The court held that probable cause existed:
"No one of the indicia drawn from prior incidents of illicit traffic was
alone sufficient to justify a reasonable man in the belief that appellant's
bags contained contraband, but taken together they rendered it prob-
able." " The coincidence of the circumstances was found to be so
rare that the possibility of the invasion of the privacy of an innocent
individual was unlikely. Had the airline employees themselves con-
ducted the initial search and seizure rather than calling the police, the
court might well have determined that probable cause still existed."
Just as the police and airline employees are presumed to be working
as a team for the purposes of state action, so may they be considered
a team for purposes of probable cause. 9
The police bulletins in Temple and McGrew did not provide suffi-
ciently specific information to supply probable cause for the searches
and seizures. The Temple court found that the bulletin, standing alone,
was insufficient to provide the police with probable cause for a search.""
The described trunks could have been any of thousands of standard
models passing daily through an airlines terminal. The elaborate
pattern of behavior described in the Hernandez bulletin was absent.
The bulletin in McGrew failed to meet even the level of specificity in
the Temple bulletin. 1 No description of the trunks was provided.
The employees were simply to be alert for all suspicious trunks, par-
ticularly heavy padlocked footlockers. In neither case was the fourth
amendment standard met.
CONCLUSION
Although a necessary and useful tool of law enforcement, police
bulletins should serve primarily as a reminder to citizens to notify the
police if they find or suspect that they have found evidence of crime.
When a bulletin can reasonably be expected to induce a private citizen
to act on behalf of the police, his acts should fall within the purview
of the fourth and fourteenth amendments. When the citizen-agent's
acts are illegal, exclusion of the resulting evidence is necessary to deter
the police from using bulletins to induce private citizens to engage in
police activities which the police themselves could not perform.
471d. at 627.
48The Hernandez court found that the Government had sustained its burden of
proving that it would have been impractical to secure a warrant before the bags
were removed. Id. Because the police did not need a warrant, neither did citizen-
agents.
49 Cf. Mullaney v. State, 5 Md. App. 248, 246 A.2d 291 (1968); People v.
Horowitz, 21 N.Y.2d 55, 233 N.E2d 453, 286 N.Y.S.2d 473 (1967). In both cases
the court determined that, even though the arresting policeman did not have probable
cause to make an arrest based on his own knowledge and observations, the arrest
was valid because he was acting on information or orders from superior police officials,
and the police as a whole had probable cause to arrest. The police were not required
to inform the arresting officer of how they obtained the information, but the court
required proof of probable cause from the police as a whole.
50 80 Cal. Rptr. at 890-91.51 See text accompanying notes 4-6 .vipra.
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